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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
\\' .\ Ll(f1~H RANK & 'I1RUS'l' COM-
J'"\ '~ \', J1~xPcutor of the Estate of 
1rn1un~H'l' E. SARGEN'l1, De-
('l':l "\ '( 1, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
TH 1 1 ~ STATE TAX COMMISSION 
OF PTAH, 
Def end ant. 
Case No. 
10629 
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF 
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE 
'11hiR is a matter before the Supreme Court of the 
State of Utah requesting review of the State Tax Com-
mission's decision that "stepchildren in loco parentis" 
to a decedent do not qualify for the inheritance tax ex-
emption allowed for certain transfers to members of 
the immediate family because they are not "children" 
1rithin lite meaning of Sec. 59-12-2 Utah Code Annotated 
( 1 ~Jj;~). 
1 
DISPOSITION BEFORE THE STA1'1~ rI'AX 
COMl\HSSION 
The Tax Commission disallowed an f'Xemption 
claimed by the executor of the estate of the uecedent fol' 
bequests to decedent's stepchildren. A hearing took 
place December 15, 1965 upon the executor's petition fol' 
a refund at which the exemption was disallowed and 
the refund denied. Upon a stipulation of facts by the 
attorney for the Commission and the attorney for the 
executor of the estate the Commission rendered itR 
final decison April 27, 1966 disallowing the exemption 
and denying the refund. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON THIS REVIEW 
The executor seeks a judicial clarification of the 
statutory exemption by interpreting the word "chil-
dren" used in Sec. 59-12-2 Utah Code Annotated (1953) 
to include stepchildren who are in loco parentis; and a 
reversal of the Tax Commission's decision disallowing 
the exemption to stepchildren in loco parentis to the 
decedent and its denial of the requested refund. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Herbert E. Sargent, a resident of Salt Lake City, 
Salt Lake County, State of Utah, Died November 27, 
1963 · named in his will as heirs were three surviving 
' 
stepchildren, Edward R., William Y., and Richard L. 
Bywater. Although not legally adopted these children 
had been raised by the deceased in loco parentis rontin-
2 
i _.... 
tinnsly from the date of his marriage to their natural 
moiher on ::\larch 29, 1931. Walker Bank and Trust 
Com pn ny, the executor of the estate of the deceased, 
prepared an estate tax return and filed the same \vi.th 
1lw 8tate Tax Commission claiming therein the statu-
tory exemption permitted for bequests to "children" as 
proYi<lcd in Section 59-12-2 Utah Code Annotated (1953). 
'rlie State Tax Commission disallowed the exemp-
tiou 011 the grounds that unadopted stepchildren who 
are i11 loco parentis to a decedent do not qualify as 
"('hiJdren" within the meaning of the aforementioned 
statute. 
'rhe executor of the estate requested a refund in 
ihe sum of $1,200.00 under the exemption statute. The 
request was denied, whereupon the executor petitioned 
for a hearing before the State Tax Commission to de-
termine whether the exemption should be allowed. A 
hearing on December 15, 1965 resulted in a continued 
disallowance of the exemption by the State Tax Com-
mission. 
Upon a stipulation of facts by the State Tax Com-
mission and the executor the Commission rendered its 
formal decision on the 27th day of April, 1966 denying 
the claimed refund for the reason that persons not nat-
nral or adopted children of a decedent who are in loco 
)iareutis to him or her during his or her lifetime do not 
qualify as ''children'' under the provisions of Section 
59-12-2 Utah Code Annotated (1953) and are, there-
fore, not entitled to the exemption provided for "chil-
3 
dren." The executor of the estate petitioned for a n·-
view of the State Tax Commission's decision. 
POINT I 
SECTION 59-12-2 UTAH CODE ANNO'l1ATED 
(1953) ON ITS FACE IS BROAD ENOUGH TO 
EN COMP ASS STEPCHILDREN WHO ARE 
IN LOCO PARENT IS. 
59-12-2 Utah Code Annotated (1953) provides: 
"Amount of tax on net estates. - A tax 
equal to the sum of following percentages of the 
market value of the net estate shall be imposed 
upon the tr an sf er of the net estate of every de-
cedent, whether a resident or nonresident of this 
state: 
Three per cent of the amount by which the 
net estate exceeds $10,000 and not to exceed 
$25,000, except where property not exceeding in 
value the sum of $40,000 goes to the husband, 
wife and/or children of the deceased or any or 
all of them descent, devise, bequest or transfer 
directly or through a trustee, then in such case 
the exemptions shall be the amount so going not 
to exceed $40,000 ; 
Five per cent of the amount by which the net 
estate exceed $25,000 and does not exceed $75,000 
except ·where property not exceeding in value the 
sum of $40,000 goes to the husband, wife and/or 
children of the deceased or any or all of them by 
descent, devise, bequest or transfer directly or 
through a trustee, then in such case the exemp-
tion shall be the amount so going not to exceed 
$40,000, but on the excess of $40,000 the ra~e 
shall be as herein provided; ...... '' Emphasis 
supplied. 
4 
This section of the Utah Code <1Nding with exemp-
tiurn; i~ <l0rive<l from Chapter 113 of the Laws of Utah 
111' rn-r/. rrhe lcgislati\'e history of this law fails to re-
ycnl the intent of the legislatme at the time of its pass-
age. ( rn4·7 Senate J onrnnl, pp 185, 205, 264, 352, 391; 
l~J~7 House J onrnal, pp 388, 4;37, 471). Without any 
'.!nidqJost in addition to the statute itself, the same 
i:l1otdd he applied to iuclnJe stepchildren in loco parentis 
as \1ell as natural children. Pacific First Federal Sa/'-
iuqs & J,oan Association r. Pierce ComzJany, 27 1N ash. 
~cl :{'17, 178 P. 2<l 351; Den1171 r. Wooster, 175 Wash. 272, 
27 P. 2d 328. 
rrhere are no judicial decisions of the court of this 
state interpreting the statutory provisions with which 
the i11stant case is eoncerned. Therefore, an examin-
ation of the actions of the legislatures of other states 
nncl an i11quiry into the judicial interpretations of the 
l('gal relationship of "children," "stepchildren" and 
"chilJren in loco parc11tis" seems appropriate and will 
icleutif ~· the guideposts necessary to a proper resolution 
of this particular case and a clarification of the Statute. 
POINT II 
Sll\IILAR TAXING S'rATUTES OF OTHER 
JURISDICrl1IONS SUPPOR'l1 THE VIEW 
THAT STEPCHILDREN SHOULD BE 
EQUATED \VITH NATURAL CHILDREN UN-
DER THE LA\V. 
:B1 orty-nine of the fifty states (Nevada being the 
only exception) have enacted in one form or another an 
5 
estate or inheritallce tax statute. The inheritance tax 
statutes usually base the exemption permitted upon the 
degree of relationship between the beneficiaries of the 
decedent's estate and the decedent. Thus, in most states 
a larger exemption will be granted to a surviving Rpom;e 
and to surviving children than to brothers, sisters, and 
other collateral relations. 
Seven of the forty-nine states operate under estate 
tax statutes which closely approximate the estate tax 
provisions of the Internal Revenue Code (1954). The 
remaining forty-two states have adopted inheritance tax 
statutes or a combination of inheritance and estate tax 
legislation. In the latter case, however, the legislation 
has provided in each instance for exemptions based upon 
the degree of relationship between the beneficiaries and 
the decedent. 
Of these forty-two states, twenty-five have expressly 
placed children and stepchildren in the same class for 
exemption purposes. (See appendix "A".) The weight 
of legislative precedent, therefore, suggests that in most 
instances where the question of exemptions to step-
children has been contemplated by the legislatures of 
other states it has been the desire and intent of these 
legislatures to make no distinction between the rela-
tionship of a child to his or her natural parent and that 
of a stepchild to his or her stepparent. 
Of the seventeen remaining states employing inher-
itance tax statutes, five have granted some degree of 
exemption to stepchildren thus exemplifying legislative 
6 
n:cog11iti011, intcuiion, and desire to afford this class 
some degTC'C' of' favor. (See appendix "B"). 
It seems manifestly unfair to automatically dis-
allow the statutory exemption to stepchildren who are 
in loco parentis merely because the statute is silent as 
to whether the word "children" includes or excludes 
such a daRs of beneficiaries, when so many sister states 
have considered the problem and solved it by expressly 
granting the exemption to this clasR to a greater or 
lesser degree. In caseR of doubt, taxing statutes are 
construed in favor of the taxpayer. Pacific First Fed-
Pral Sa1,i11.gs cf; Loan Assor:iation v. Pierce Company, 
Supra; People v. Snyder, 353 Ill. 184, 187 N. E. 158, 88 
ALR 1012; Lewis v. O'Hair, 130 S. W. 2d 379. 
POINT III 
JUDICIAL DECISIONS OF OTHER STATES 
EQUATING NATURAL CHILDREN WITH 
STEPCHILDREN SUPPORT THE VIEW 
THArr NO DISTINCTION SHOULD BE MADE 
BETWEEN NATURAL CHILDREN AND 
STEPCHILDREN WHO ARE IN LOCO PA-
RENT IS. 
An examination of some of the judicial decisions 
""hich have considered the problem of equating the nat-
ural parent - natural child reationship with that of 
stepparent - stepchild will be most helpful in deter-
mining the proper resolution to the problem in the 
instant case and in clarifying the exemption statute. 
One of the leading decisions on this issue is In re 
Bordeaux' Estate, 37 Wash. 2d 561, 225 P. 2d 433. In 
7 
that case the f'ourt \\·as asked to intPrpret a sedioll ot 
the inheritan<'e tax statute of the State of \Yasl1i1Jcrt 011 M . 
\Vhile the question of tlw i11t0qHetatio11 of the· word 
"child" as inf'lnding stepchildre11 \ms 110t dir0etlv hC'fon· 
the court the decision does clisc1rns the prnbkm. 
''The law of \Viscousin s0ems to have hl'l'IJ 
established by the case of Renner 'I'. S111Jn·111e 
Lodge of Bohemian 1'i1la1·m1ia11 Rfmrro!c11t ,c;,J_ 
ciefy, 89 \Vis. 401, 62 N. \V. 80. This easp eo 11 _ 
strued the charter of a benefit soeiety whieh pro-
vided that its purpose was 'to assist and giw 
pecuninary aid to the widows and orphans of <1e-
ceased members.' It was held that 'orphans' iu-
<'lnded a stepchild whom the deeeased had desig-
nated as beneficiary. The case is not i11eo11sis-
tent with the theory of the jury and incest ca;..;rs 
that the tie of affinity is broken upon ilte death 
of the spouse \\"hose marriage ereated it; for it 
appeared that this spouse, the mother of tlw strp-
<'hild iu the f'ase, sunived her husband. 'J'he tenor 
of its reasoning, however, was adopted in Jo11es 
n. Mangan, 151 JVis. 215, 138 N. W". 618, 621, a 
case in which the insured, a member of the asso-
ciation in question, named his stepmother as henr-
ficiary in his henefit certifieatc, his natural fathl'r 
having died. The ronstitution of the assoriaiion 
provided that an insured rould designate' his 
mother as beneficiary.'' 
"The eourt held that the word 'mother' in-
rluded a mother by affinity, and further said: 
'***,it is obvious that in many rases the step-
mother may have strong rlaims upon the rhih1 
whom she cares for during minority, and no 
reason appears to us why surh child should not 
have the right under the artielrs of association 
in this rase to make the stepmotlwr the ohjrd 
of his bounty." 
8 
'''1'l1P ~;tcpmotli('l' \Yas a(·r·ordi1wly allo>YCtl to 
n·co\ l'I' i l1f' J'n1l<l in disputP. ~\ n '"'c~pucially i11-
\('J"t's1 ing· r·;ts(• lwlo11gi11g to this group iR Hmnmel 
r. ,','11jil"l'!il!' r'11J1dare !11111rnrn{ Orrlf'r HP]Jfa-
s111il1s, :2:-Jfi Pa. Hi.+, 100 ~\. :-iSfJ, 390. 'l'hi8 was an 
adio11 hrougl1t IY\' tlie designatecl 1Je11eficiarv on 
<l IH•ucfit ('Crtifieatl' iss11Pd hy a fraternal c~rpo­
rntion to lier tlecPasell sfrvfatlicr. The ::\Iaryland 
~:ta1ntP urnlt·r wlii('lt !110 Clssoeiation was incor-
p·ir:dPrl pro1ided that 1K•11dits coulrl lie made 
0111:' to 'children.' The beneficiary's natural 
motlwr had diccl, a11<l the court apparently re-
g-an ld the af fi nit:, rl'lat ioush ip lwtwPen the 
dnug·l1tl'l' nlHl 11L'r stepfather as terminated. But 
1 lw eonrt disenss<·d the lcgislatiYe purpose in 
c•11aeti11g 11H· statute, >Yl1ieh it found to be "to 
afford an opportunit~, to a member to assist, 
nfkr his <lcntli, 011r• or more of his family or those 
,,,ho, though 11ct related to him, arc members of 
l1is houschokl arnl holll like intimate relations 
\\'itli l1im'; m1d, basing its decision on this con-
sirh•ratio11, held that the legislature, in its use 
of the word 'ehiklren,' had not intended to con-
fiw• itself strictly to a class related by blood or 
affinity. Its exact words wer!' as follows: '***, 
w0 think that 'children' in the statute was in-
ternled to include thosP >d10 stood in that rela-
tion to the heacl of the house, though not related 
h~T blood or affinity. In the case in hand, it is 
clear, under the e>·idence, that the plaintiff held 
the relation of ehild to the deceased. ***She had 
borne his name from infancy until her marriage, 
and, as the e\'iclence conclusively shows, he had 
trca tl'cl her from her infaney as his child.' " 
Despite the abse11ce of any attempt to comply with 
the formalities of adoption the rights and duties of a 
pan•nt and chilcl attach when one admits a child into 
9 
his family and acts as if he were the parent to the child. 
Young v. Hipple, 273 Pa. 439, 117 Atl. 182; Trudell c. 
Leatherby, 212 Cal. 678, 300 P. 7; Daniel v. Tolan, 58 
Okla. 666, 157 P. 756. 
Liability has been imposed upon a stepparent for 
medical services rendered to a stepchild on the ground 
that the stepfather had held the child out as a member 
of his family. Monk v. Hurlburt, 151 Wis. 41, 138 N. W. 
59; Cohen v. Lieberman, 157 .Misc. 844, 284 N. Y. Supp. 
970 rev'd on other grounds 160 Misc. 310, 289 N. Y. 
Supp. 797. 
One standing in loco parentis to another has the 
burden of disproving undue influence when a deed is 
made to him by the other ·without adequate considera-
tion. Daniel v. Talon, Supra; Sargent v. Foland, 207 P. 
349, 352. 
One standing in loco parentis to a child cannot hold 
in adverse possession to the child. McLaughlin v. Morris, 
150 Ark. 347, 234 S.W. 259. Such a person, however, 
like the natural parent, is entitled to the services of the 
child and an in loco parentis relationship has been held 
to create an insurable interest. Carpenter v. U. S. Life 
Insurance Company, 161 Pa. 9, 28 Atl. 943. 
A child may not recover from a foster parent money 
received by the latter on account of services performed 
by the child for strangers. Sparks v. Hinckley, 78 Utah 
502, 5 P. 2d 570; Burdick v. Girmshaw, 113 N.J. Eq. 591, 
168 Atl. 186. 
A foster parent may maintain the action available 
to a natural parent for the loss of services caused by 
10 
ucgligcut injury or battery to a stepchild or by seduction 
of such a chikl. Stoddard v. Campbell, 7 Ga. App. 363, 
108 S.E. 311; lVessell v. Gerken, 36 Misc. 221, 73 N.Y. 
Supp. 192. Conversely, the extension of the master 
servant principles involved in the family purpose doc-
trine as to automobiles has operated to impose liability 
on one who stands in loco parentis to another. McGee v. 
Crawfnrd, 205 N.C. 318, 171 S.E. 326; Jones v .Cook, 
!)6 W. Va. 60, 123 S.E. 407. 
\Vhere a testator stands in loco parentis to a legatee 
the latter has been treated similarly to a natural child, 
in that interest payments are allowed from the date of 
death of the decedent rather than from the date when 
payment of the legacy is due. Brown v. Knapp, 79 N.Y. 
136; Von Der Horst i'. Von Der Horst, 88 Md. 127, 140, 
41Atl.124, 125. 
A gift intervivos to one standing in loco parentis 
may cause an ademption of a pecuniary legacy. Ellard 
v. Ferris, 91 Ohio St. 339, 348, 110 N.E. 476, 479. 
Services rendered to an infant or the maintenance 
of an infant provided by a stepparent or another person 
standing in loco parentis are presumed to be gratuitous, 
treating such children as natural children for that par-
ticular legal relationship. Livingston v. Hammon, 162 
Mass. 375, 38 N.E. 968; Williams v. Hutchinson, 3 N.Y. 
312. 
The commentator in 7 ALR 2d at page 91 speaking 
of gratuitous services of stepchildren performed for a 
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stepparent states that if the parties assume thl' rcda-
tionship of parent and ehild the g011eral presumption.~ 
and implications arising from that relntionship may he 
applicable ·with respect to a claim for services rr11dPred 
by one to the other; 
"in Livin9ston r. JI runmon, 162 Mass. 37:), 
38 N. E. 968, it is said: 'A man is not bound to 
maintain the ehildren of his ·wife by a former 
marriage, but if he chooses to receive them into 
his family and to assume the relation of a parent 
to them in their daily life, the law will not imply 
a contract on his part to pay them for services 
which they render him while members of his 
family, or a contract on theirs to pay him for 
their maintenance . . . . . The law approves and 
encourages the assumption of such a relation, as 
prornotive of the best 'interests of all parties by 
uniting them in an orderly family life. If nothing 
more appears than helpfulness in such relations, 
it will not permit an implication of a contract to 
make compensation in money on either side. It 
will presume, also, that what was done proceeded 
from a higher attribute of human nature than 
the desire to bargain and get gain, namely an 
unselfish love of a parent for his children and 
of the children for their parent. Of course there 
may be circumstances in any case ·which will rebut 
the ordinary presumption from the residence to-
gether in the same family of persons so related, 
and will call for an inference that the stepfather 
was not acting in loco parentis, but in a different 
relation.' (underscoring supplied.) 
"In Smith v. Rogers, 24 Kan. 103, Am Rep 
254, it is declared that if a stepfather voluntarily 
assumes the care and support of a stepchild he 
stands in loco parentis, and the presumption is 
that they deal with each other as parent and 
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cl1iI(1, m1<1 n ci thcr rompensa ti on for hoard is pre-
,:-; nm eel on the 01w hand, nor for services on the 
other. '11 0 the same effect sec Longhofer v. 
llerbcl, :33 Kau. 278, 111 P. 423, in which it is 
stated that presumptively a minor living vvith 
his stepfather is not to be paid for his labor. 
''A~ statute referred to in Daniel v. T'olon, 53 
Okla. 666, 157, P. 756 provides that 'a husband 
is not hound to m<1i11tain his ~wife's children by 
a former hushancl; but if he receives them into 
his family and supports them, it is presumed 
that he does so as a parent, and where such is 
the case, they are i10t liable to him for their sup-
port, nor he to them for their services.' " 
Another field which aids iu shedding light on the 
instant problem is that of child ,-. parent in tort actions. 
fo Trudell I'. Leatheruy, Supra, plaintiff brought 
an action against his stepmother for negligently oper-
ating an automobile in which plaintiff was riding as a pas-
senger. The court, in denying the plaintiff's right to main-
tain the suit, stated the reason for the negative rule was 
to avoid a disruption of the peace and harmony of the 
members of a household and that 
''the same vexatious conditions created in the 
family circle by litigation between parent and 
cl1ild, would result from like litigation instituted 
by a minor has been taken into and is a mem-
ber of the household of the latter." 
Similarly, in McKeli·ey v. McKelvey, 111 Tenn. 388, 
77 ~.\V. 664, the court dismissed the suit by a minor 
against the minor's father and stepmother for cruel and 
inlmman treatment, hasing its decision upon the same 
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reaso,1iJlg as employed by the court 111 the Trudrll l'asp , 
supra. 
In some jurisdictions, however, courts will permit 
tort actions to be brought by a natural ehilcl against his 
parents and in those jurisdictions, a stepchild as well 
as a natural child may recover for the tortious acts of 
his stepparents.Trescliman r. Trcschman, 28 Ind. App. 
206, 61 N.E. 961 (action brought for assault and battery 
committed by the def cndant on his stepdaughter). 
It is of no moment that some jurisdictions permit 
recovery for the tortious acts of a parent or stepparent 
and that some deny recowry. vVhat is notevvorthy is that 
in either allowing or disallowing recovery, the courtR ' 
are consistent in their attitude to both natural children 
and those standing in lo ca parent is (stepchildren). 
Finally, the decisions involving reimbursement for 
funeral expenses shed light upon the judicial interpreta-
tion of the stepparent - stepchild rel~tionship. While 
there are exceptions to the rule, it is quite generally 
recognized that a third person, other than the personal 
representative or surviving spouse, who pays the funeral 
expenses of a decedent is entitled to reimbursement 
therefor from the estate, provided he did not act offi-
ciously, as a volunteer or as a meddler. This rule appears 
to be based on the necessity of burial in most instances 
before the selection of a personal representative or even 
before the discovery of a will. Here again the courts haYe 
fully equated the stepparent - stepchild relationship 
with that of a parent and his natural child. Kelly v. Snair, 
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163 l\Tinn. 298, 210 N. W. 105 (decedent's stepdaughter 
who employs an undertaker and pays for the bill is en-
t itle<l to reimbursement from the estate of the deceased); 
f1ay i'. Lay, 201 Ky. 93, 255 S.W. 1054 (decedent's step-
son who paid the burial expenses was entitled to re-
imbursement from the estate). In both of these cited 
cases the courts, in arriving at their respective decisions, 
saw no reason for distinguishing between the stepparent 
-- stepchild relationship and that of the parent - child. 
It is apparent from the above that the contention of 
the estate of Herbert E. Sargeant is soundly based upon 
judicial precedent in many diverse contexts of law. 
POINT IV 
THE EFFECT OF THE STATUTORY EX-
EMPTION rs TO ENCOURAGE TESTATORS 
AND TESTATRIXES TO LEAVE THEIR 
ESTATES TO MEMBERS OF THEIR IMME-
DIATE FAl\IILY. 
There is a social value in encouraging a man or 
woman to leave his or her estate to members of the im-
mediate family. Whether the idea of encouraging families 
to take care of their own is a distortion of the historical 
hangovers from the early English law or whether the 
idea has come into our law through a rational process and 
judicial development is of very little significance for this 
problem. The encouragement is a natural consequence of 
the exemption and should therefore be recognized and 
guided by an equitable application of the law which 
brought it into effect. 
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The statute which allows a snrvi\-ing- witlo"w to choo~l' 
a statutory share of her hnsband's ostate tlwreh;- Jll'g'H-
tiving his efforts to lean her less than one-third of Iii~ 
estate has a similar effect to the exemption statute nf 
keeping widows and dependents off the doles of the state. 
74-4-1 et seq. Utah Code Annotated (1953). The exemp-
tion in the tax statute, 59-12-2 Utah Code Annotntrd 
(1953) should not be applied in such a manner as to 
defeat this beneficial social effect. 
In many instances stepchildren are distinguisl1Prl 
from natural children only hv blood and name. In nry . . . 
many instances the family bonds of affection and parental 
sentiment are stronger between in loco parr1tfis RteprJii1_ 
dren and stepparents than between natural children arnl 
natural parents. Stepchildren who lian lived in /0111 
pare11tis to a decedent are in as great a need of support 
The parental sentiment, motives and desires of the 
typical testator or testatrix who leaves part or all of 
his or her estate to in loco parentis stepchildren must 
certainly be the same as the parental sentiment, motives 
and desires of a natural parent who leaves his or her 
estaite to natural children. It is conceivable that some 
decedents have kno>vn no other family (in the sense of 
children) besides his or her in loco parentis stepchildren. 
In such a situation the decedent may intend to leave l1is 
or her estate to the only immediate family knovvn to him 
or her with all the benefits the law allows for transfers 
made to the family. If a testator has such a desire it 
should not be frustrated by the State Tax Commission 
concluding that these children are not really his/or her 
family because they do not have the proper blood tieR. 
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'J'hc lie11eficial efcet of the statute will be applied 
mon'. equitably and the intention of the typical testator 
or testatrix will be fulfilled rather than frustrated if the 
;;t:ttutory exemption is allowed to in loco parentis step-
f'liil<lren. 
POINT V 
TfUJ STATUTOR\' EXE11IPTION MAY BE 
j_PPLIED BY THF~ CO~£MISSION -WITH 
J1~~\Sl1j AND IN AN JijQUITABLE MANNER 
BY INCLUDING STEPCHILDREN WHO ARE 
IN LOCO P ARENTIS TO A DECEDENT. 
"In loco parcntis" has a fairly definite meaning; 
Black's law dictionary defines "in loco parentis" as "in 
the place of a parent; instead of a parent; charged, 
factitiously with a parent's rights, duties, and respon-
sibilities." TVeatherby v. Dixon, 19 Ves 412; Brinkerhoff 
r. M prsclis, 24 N.J. Law 863; Ca.pek v. K ropik, 129 Ill. 
fi09, 21 N.E. 836; Flinn v Sonman Shaft & Coal Comp(}Jny, 
:33 A 2d 525, 153 Pa. Super 76. 
Generally, one who takes a child into his home and 
treats it as a member of his own family, educating and 
supporting it as if it were his own child is standing in 
loco z)(Jrentis to that child. The test is whether the person 
intends to place himself in the position of a lawful parent 
1rith all the obligations and responsibilities of such a 
position. 
To assume the in loco parentis relationship the fol-
lowing facts must be sho\VIl to exist: ( 1) The person in 
the role of parent must consciously intend to assume the 
relationship; (2) He must actually fulfill the obligations 
17 
of a parent by supporting and otherwise providing for 
the child; (3) The person with whom the relationship 
is sought to be established must be a minor or a pers011 
in need of parental support because of physical handi-
caps. Bourbeau v. U. S. 76 F Supp. 778, 779; Trotter r. 
Rollan, 311, S.W. 2d 723, 729; Brovdy v. Jones arid 
Laughlin Steel Corpomtion, 21 A. 2d 437, 438, 145 Pa. 
Super 602; In re Lutz Estate, 107 NYS 2d 388, 392, 394, 
201 Misc. 539. 
Since the relationship has been judicially defined, 
Sec. 59-12-2 Utah Code Annotated (1953) can be applied 
just as easily by including such children as by including 
only natural children. The State Tax Commission may 
identify very readily children in loco parentis to a de-
cedent just as they now identify natural children. The 
judiciary has been equal to such a task in other contexts 
of the law as referred to in Point Number III. 
POINT VI 
CLARIFICATION OF THE EXEMPTION 
STATUTE IS THE DUTY OF THE JUDICI-
ARY. 
Very of ten the legislature does not consider all of 
the contingencies which may occur and the possible re-
finement which may be argued with respect to a statute 
drafted and put into effect. Subsequently it is discov-
ered that a law may be applied inequitably or that a loop 
hole exists making it possible for the astute to avoid its 
application to them. In such instances the judiciary must 
clarify and define the law closing the loop holes ancl 
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dearing inequitable restrictions. The judiciary must meet 
this task or our system of law will become an ineffective 
institution for governing social and business relation-
:-:hi ps (in the general sense). The legislature may clarify 
a law and may express its intention but usually only after 
pressure is brought to bear upon it from sufficient num-
bers of those affected or simply by the greviousness of 
an obvious error being exposed to public view. The type 
of injustice with which we are concerned in the instant 
case is not a palpable one nor does it affect a large group 
of legislative constituents at any given time. The ap-
plication of the tax exemption statute by the State Tax 
Commission as in the instant case nips its victims one 
or two at a time and their cries for relief are not easily 
heard by a preoccupied, loosely guided, legislature. 
Justice will be served in the instant case and the law 
will continue to fulfill its proper function by a judicial 
carification of Section 59-12-2, Utah Code Annotated 
(1953) in favor of an exemption to stepchildren who are 
in loco parentis to a decedent. 
CONCLUSION 
Since there is a statutory exemption allowed in favor 
of "children" but those who qualify as coming within 
the meaning of that term are not identified clearly by the 
statute itself nor by legislative history, and since there 
are no judicial decisions in the State of Utah identifying 
with clarity the "children" to whom the statutory exemp-
tion should apply, a proper resolution to the problem in-
volved requires an examination of similar statutes of 
19 
other jurisdictions, and the judicial derisions of otlin 
states. A deep reflection upon the effect of nllowi11µ: a11 
exemption to anyone is also neressan- to a proper n>.~o­
lution of the instant problem. 
Upon our examination and reflection the correct re:-;o 
lution seems to stand out boldly in favor of allowiwr . ~ 
the exemption to stepchildren ·who are in loco 11arc11fis a~ 
well as to natural children and rhildren by adoption. 
The taxing statutes of the various sister states 11s 
well as jndicial derisions in other contexts of the law 
support a view of allowing stepchildren in loco parc11f1s 
the exemption. Therefore, the way is clearly marked by 
similar actions of the legislatures of sister states, liy the 
judicial decisions of the same, in equating natural chil-
dren and stepchildren in other contexts of the law arnl 
by a review and reflection of the effect of the statutor~ 
exemption in encouraging testators and testatrixes to 
leave their estates to the immediate family. The State 
Tax Commission's decision disallowing the exemption 
must be reversed for the foregoing reasons. 
Respectfully submitted, 
GLEN M. RICHMAN 
of OWEN & WARD 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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APPENDIX A 
STATES WHICH PROVIDE SAME CLASSI-
FICATION UNDER INHERITANCE TAX 
LAWS FOR CHILDREN AND STEPCHIL-
DREN. 
Alaska - Class 1: Wife, husband, lineal issue, adopted 
or mutually acknowledged ehild or children of de-
cedent or their lineal issue. 
See. 43, 30, 43.50 Alaska Statutes Annotated (1962). 
California - Class A: Husband, widow, lineal issue, lin-
eal issuE' of adopted or mutually acknowledged child, 
adopted child of any lineal issue or child mentioned 
in Class A. 
Secs. l 3307-13310 and 13404-13407 California Codes 
Annotated. 
Colorado - Class A: Parents, spousE', children, stepchil-
dren, children adopted during their minority, any 
lineal descendant. 
Sec. 138-3-14 Colorado Revised Statutes (1963) 
Idaho - Cla,ss 1: Hus hand, wife, lineal issue, lineal an-
cestor, children adopted in conformity with Idaho 
laws, or mutually acknowledged children or their 
lineal issue. 
(Secs. 14-1406 to 14-1408) Idaho Code 
Illinois - Class A: By blood or adoption: Parents, lineal 
ancestors of decedent, husband, wife, children, broth-
E'rs, sisters, wife or widow of a son, or the husband 
or widower of a daughter, descendants of decedent, 
mutually acknowledged children of decedent, and, 
as to estates of decedents dying on or after July 
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11, 1951, descendants of mutually acknowledged rli[J_ 
dren. 
Sec. 120-375-5 Illinois Annotated Statutes 
Indiana - Class A: Spouse, children under 18 years of 
age, other lineal issue, lineal ancestor, acknowledged 
or adopted children, lineal descendant of acknowl-
edged or adopted children. 
Sec. 7-2402 Indiana Statutes Annotated (as amended 
1965) 
Kentucky - Class A. Parent, surnvrng spouse, child 
by blood, stepchild, adopted child (if adopted during 
infancy), grandchild (issue of a rhild by blooil, of a 
stepchild or of a child adopted during infancy). 
Sec. 140.070. Kentucky Revised Statufos. 
Louisiana~Class A: Direct descendant, by blood or affin-
ity, ascendant or surviving spouse. 
Sec. 47-2401-2402 Lopisiana Revised Statutes (1950). 
Maine - Class A: Husband, wife, lineal ancestor, lineal 
descendant, adopted child, stepchild, adoptive par-
ent ... 
Sec. 36-3462-3464 Main Revised Statutes Annotated 
Michigan- ClaHS 1: Husband, wife, grandfather, grand-
mother, father, mother, child, brother, sister, wife or 
widow of son, husband of daughter, adopted child, 
mutually acknowledged child, lineal descendant. 
Sec. 205.202 Compiled Laws of Michigan 
Minnesota - Class A: Widow, minor or dependent child, 
and minor or dependent legally adopted child. Class 
B: Husband, adult child or other lineal descendant, 
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adult legally adopted child or issue, lineal ancestor 
a]l(l mutually acknowledged child or issue. 
Nee. 2!:1] .03 (2) MinneRota Statutes 
:'.lfontana - Class 1: Wife, husband, lineal ancestor, lin-
eal isRue, adopted child, mutually acknowledged 
rhild, and lineal isRue of adopted or mutually ack-
nowledged child. 
Rer. 9l.4409 ReviRed Codes of Montana 
Nebraska - Class l: Father, mother, husband, wife, 
rhild, brother, sister, wife or widow of a son, husband 
of a daughter, adopted children, lineal descendant 
horn in lawful wedlock or legally adopted, or ack-
11owledged children where the relationship has con-
tinued for a specified time. 
Sec. 77-2004 Revised Statutes of Nebraska 
New .Jersey - Class A: Parent, grandparent, spouse, 
child or adopted child or his issue, stepchild or child 
mutually acknowledged as child for 10 years be-
ginning before 15th birthday. 
Sec. 54.34-2.1 Revised Statutes of New Jersey 
New York - While New York does not have classes of 
exemptions in the formal sernie, children and step-
rhildren are permitted exemptions of $5,000. 
Tax Sec. 249-Q Consolidated Laws of New York 
~orth Carolina - Class A: Wife, husband, lineal issue, 
adopted child, stepchild, and lineal ancestor. 
Sec. 105-4 General Statutes of North Carolina 
:forth Dakota - (b) Lineal aneestor or descendant, 
adopted child, stepehild or its lineal descendant, if 
a minor. 
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( c) Lineal ancestor or descendant, adopted child 
stepchild or its lineal descendant, if not a minor. ' 
Sec. 57-37-11 North Dakota Century Code Annotatrd 
Oregon - Class 1: Grandparents, parents, spouses, chil-
dren, stepchildren, or lineal descendants. 
Ch. 418, Laws of 1959 Amending Sec. 12-118 of Ore-
gon Revised Statutes 
Pennsylvania - Class A: Grandparents, parents, spou~e, 
lineal descendants (including children and their 
descendants, adopted descendants and their descend-
ants, stepchildren ... ) ... 
Sec. 72-2485-403-72-2485-405 Pennsylvania Statnte:; 
Annotated 
South Dakota - Class 1: Wife, husband, or lineal issue, 
lega1ly adopted child, mutually acknowledged child 
to whom decedent for not less than ten years stood 
in the relation of parent, provided the relation-
ship began at or before the child's fifteenth birthday. 
Sec. 57.2402 South Dakota Code (1960 Supplement) 
Vermont - Class 1: Husband, wife, child, father, moth-
er, brother, sister, grandchild, wife or widow of son, 
husband of a daughter, adopted child, stepchild, 
child of such adopted child or stepchild, other lineal 
descendant. 
Sec. 32-6541 Vermont Statutes Annotated. 
Virginia - Class A: Father, mother, grandfathers, 
grandmothers, husband, wife, children by legal adop-
tion, stepchildren, grandchildren and all other lineal 
ancestors and lineal descendants. 
Sec. 58-153 Code of Virginia (1950) 
24 
Washington - Class A: Lineal ancestor, lineal descend-
ant, husband, wife, stepchild, or lineal descendant of 
a stepchild, adopted child or lineal descendant of an 
adopted child, adopted child of the lineal descendant, 
son-in-law, or daughter-in-law of decedent. 
Sec. 83.08.020 - 83.08.040 Revised Code of Wash-
ington 
West Virginia - Class 1 : Spouse, children, stepchildren, 
descendants of children, parents. 
Sec. 845 (d) West Virginia Code Annotated (1955) 
Wisconsin - Class 1 ( c) : Lineal issue, lineal ancestor, 
adopted child, mutually acknowledged child, lineal 
issue of adopted or mutually acknowledged child .... 
Sec. 72-02 Wisconsin Statutes 
APPENDIX B 
STATES WHICH PROVIDE DIFFERENT 
CLASSIFICATION UNDER INHERITANCE 
TAX LAWS FOR CHILDREN AND STEP-
CHILDREN. 
Connecticut - Class A : Children 
Class B : Stepchildren 
Sec. 12-344 General Statutes of Connecticut 
Iowa - Class 1: Children 
Class 2: Stepchildren 
450.9-450.10 Code of Iowa (1962) 
Massachusetts - Class A: Children 
Class C: Stepchildren 
Sec. 65-1 Massachusetts Laws Annotated 
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Ohio - Class A: Children 
Class C - Stepchildren 
Sec. 5334 Ohio General Code Annotated 
Rhode Island - Class 1 : Children 
Class 2: Stepchildren 
Sec. 44-22-8 General Laws of Rhode Island 
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